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On the prospects of a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness

In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. pp. 107--122 (1995)

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  1. What about the unconscious?Chris Mortensen - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):162-162.
    O'Brien & Opie do not address the question of the psychotherapeutic role of unconscious representational states such as beliefs. A dilemma is proposed: if they accept the legitimacy of such states then they should modify what they say about dissociation, and if they do not, they owe us an account of why.
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  • What's new here?Bruce Mangan - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):160-161.
    O'Brien & Opie's (O&O's) theory demands a view of unconscious processing that is incompatible with virtually all current PDP models of neural activity. Relative to the alternatives, the theory is closer to an AI than a parallel distributed processing (PDP) perspective, and its treatment of phenomenology is ad hoc. It raises at least one important question: Could features of network relaxation be the “switch” that turns an unconscious into a conscious network?
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  • Conscious behavior explained.Martin Kurthen - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):155-158.
    Current neurobiological research on temporal binding in binocular rivalry settings contributes to a better understanding of the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness. This research can easily be integrated into a theory of conscious behavior, but if it is meant to promote a naturalistic theory of perceptual consciousness itself, it is confronted with the notorious explanatory gap argument according to which any statement of psychophysical correlations (and their interpretation) leaves the phenomenal character of, e.g., states of perceptual consciousness open. It is (...)
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