Marketisation is rife in higher education. Asymmetries between consumers and producers in markets result in inefficiencies. To address imbalances, policy-makers pushing higher education towards a market model have a tendency to increase the market power of the student by increasing information or amplifying voice. One such policy in England is called ‘students as partners.’ However, I argue here that student partnership can easily undermine relations of authority and trust between students and academic teachers.

Elvira Schnabel; Wittgenstein on Rules: what follows and what does not, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 25, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 83–94, https.

Elvira Schnabel; Wittgenstein on Rules: what follows and what does not, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 25, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 83–94, https.

In this article, the concept of school discipline will be explored in relation to that of educational interest. Initially, Clark’s account of two different kinds of school order (discipline and control) will be explained. The interest-based theory of school discipline advanced by Pat Wilson will thereafter be analysed. It will be argued that both these scholars persuasively explain how school discipline may follow when learning activities are successfully married to pupil interests and experiences. However, it will be maintained that the (...) epistemic position adopted by Wilson is problematic. Although Wilson suggests that Richard Peters placed too great an educational emphasis on initiating pupils into public traditions of knowledge, it is here claimed that Wilson did not value that development enough. With reference to Whitehead, it is concluded that discipline in schools ought to be arranged so as to help pupils foster wisdom for life, as this concept integrates liberal knowledge and educational interest. (shrink)

We ordinarily distinguish between the authority exercised by an expert and that exercised by a commander. Nevertheless, prior argumentation theorists have been unable to articulate fully the grounds on which we make this distinction. In this paper, I propose a principle for distinguishing types of authorities. I argue further that on this principle, Locke's argumentum ad verecundiam represents a third type, reducible neither to command nor expertise. Finally, I point to significant instances of this third appeal to authority, especially in (...) Roman legal and political discourse. (shrink)