The article analyzes the economic determinants of the rise and initial growth of Protestantism, specifically Calvinism, described as the Weber reverse problem in light of his thesis of Calvinist outcomes for economy. These determinants of Calvinism are differentiated from its assumed economic outcomes, specifically the emergence and development of modern capitalism in Weberian sociological accounts. It is argued and showed that the economic determinants of Calvinism’s emergence and early evolution are primarily pre-capitalist in character rather than capitalist in the modern (...) sense. Therefore, the initial overarching economic determinant and setting of early Calvinism is considered to be pre-capitalism, as distinguished from modern industrial capitalism, specifically feudalism as the ancien regime of master–servant economy. Such a pre-capitalist determinant and context suggests that of Calvinism was itself economically determined or influenced before presumably determining or influencing modern capitalism.. (shrink)

Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based “purity” concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of (...) moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind. (shrink)

Starting with the Reformation, as a social and religious mass movement, the institution of the “state” became synonymous with authority, and until the Enlightenment, the mundane absolute order deployed varied patterns. Beginning with Calvinism, which legitimized the expansion of state institutions, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marked a shift to modernization. Puritan authoritarianism, based on “saintly” discipline and on quasi-marginal freedom, developed a new, impersonal and voluntary political doctrine. While one generally associates Anglo-American Puritanism with political freedom, democracy or capitalism, (...) we argue for a very different perspective, namely that the Puritans were both partisans of a medievalist paradigm as well as genuine enemies of democratic, liberal and secular values. Moreover, we emphasize that the Anglo-American radical Puritanism was only tempered by the Enlightenment. The enlightened philosophes were the defense advocates of liberal and pluralist ideas, and came out victorious of the competiton of ideas with their Puritan rivals. (shrink)