Abstract

Divine knowledge is a very precise and difficult issue in Islamic philosophy, and the first Islamic philosopher who has seriously studied the issue is Farabi. He has discussed in detail all three types of divine knowledge. According to him, the God's knowledge to himself is a presential knowledge, not a formal representative one. God's knowledge to contingents, as being in his essence or before creation is through his knowledge of the rational forms of things in his essence, and thus it is a formal representative and a non-detailed one. He has responded to the paradox of pre-knowledge and human free will under this type of knowledge. God's knowledge to contingents, as being in his action or after creation, through his knowledge of superior causes of contingents, includes individual and contingent things, and somehow is a formal representative knowledge and a non-detailed knowledge with details. But in Fusus al-Hekam, if it is considered as one of Farabi's works, another explanation of divine knowledge is presented. Farabi's theory of divine knowledge has exerted a great influence on the later Islamic philosophers, especially Ibn Sina, but others, such as Suhrawardi and some contemporary researchers, have criticized it. In the present article, some of the most important of these critiques are explained and evaluated from the perspective of the writer. In general, Farabi's view on divine knowledge and its types has the important strengths and weaknesses that will be addressed in this article.