Defending the bounds of cognition

In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press 67--80 (2010)
Abstract
This chapter discusses the flaws of Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark’s hypothesis assumes that the nature of the processes internal to an object has nothing to do with whether that object carries out cognitive processing. The only condition required is that the object is coupled with a cognitive agent and interacts with it in a certain way. In making this tenuous connection, Clark commits the most common mistake extended mind theorists make; alleging that an object becomes cognitive once it is connected to a cognitive agent is a “coupling-constitution fallacy.” From this fallacy, many hastily proceed to the conclusion that the object or process constitutes part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing.
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0004
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Richard Menary (2006). Attacking the Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):329-344.

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