Abstract

Current philosophy of science seems to be giving an increasingly historical emphasis to the hypothetical character of its theoretical constructs and to the consequent penetration of facts by theory. This tendency has not been fostered by the influence of Whewell. He remains isolated in his historical period, a figure left behind by the progress of philosophy and science. Yet there are two important lines of thought that have considered themselves in continuity with Whewell. One runs through French positivistic neo-Kantianism to Emile Meyerson, the other derives from Mach's studies in the history of science and has some important repercussions in the Vienna Circle, particularly in the work of Otto Neurath. Marcucci seems to be more aware of the former line of thought than of the latter. However this circumstance does not affect the excellent quality of this historical exposition since its author is not aiming at a rational reconstruction of Whewell's philosophy that might be marred by a distortion in perspective. The need for such a serious reconstruction is however urgent; this study, with its emphasis on the problems of induction and idealization and on the mathematics of teleology, will certainly stimulate the present demand for further work on Whewell.--A. M.