Online research in philosophy

This essay argues that R.G. Collingwood's remarks about genre are implausible, and that they stem, despite their apparent origin in his wider account of art, from his failure to take some of his own most important insights seriously enough. Some possible reasons for that failure are suggested; and it is shown that, once the relevant insights are given their proper weight, Collingwood's account commands the resources from which a plausible story about genre might have been constructed. To this extent, the present essay constitutes a defence of Collingwood's philosophy of art.

According to R. G. Collingwood in The Principles of Art, art is the expression of emotion--a much-criticized view. I attempt to provide some groundwork for a defensible modern version of such a theory via some novel further criticisms of Collingwood, including the exposure of multiple ambiguities in his main concept of expression of emotion, and a demonstration that, surprisingly enough, his view is unable to account for genuinely creative artistic activities. A key factor in the reconstruction is a replacement of the concept of expression with that of interpretation: what artists do is to interpret, rather than express, their initial emotions, in creative ways that may go far beyond their initial impulses. Thus more broadly the paper attempts to show that the concept of interpretation is just as central to understanding artistic creativity as it is in the analysis of the critical appreciation of artworks.

The art and the artist according to Collingwood.

Collingwood published this article the same year that he published his first book on Aesthetics: "Outlines of a Philosophy of Art". The article can be divided in two main sections. In the first one Collingwood defends the existence of a Philosophy of Art in Plato's Republic, in close relation to the theory of reality expounded by Plato in the Book. From Collingwood's point of view, Plato understood art as "an appearance of an appearance", closely related to imagination, and as a symbol of truth. The second section is a critique of Plato's conception previously presented from Collingwood's own perspective.

Art as communication, by L. Tolstoi.--Art, intuition, and expression, by B. Groce.--Art as expression, by R. G. Collingwood.--The Groce-Collingwood theory of art, by J. Hospers.--The act of expression, by J. Dewey.--Art and the language of the emotions, by C. J. Ducasse.--Music as impressive and music as expressive, by E. Gurney.--Expression, by G. Santayana.--The expressiveness of colors, by W. Kadinsky.--Expression and association, by C. Hartshorne.--Expressiveness, by R. Arnheim.--The expression theory of art, by O, K. Bouwsma.--The concept of expression in art, by V. Tomas, D. Morgan and M. Beardsley.--Musical expression, by M. Beardsley.--Expressive predicates of art, by G. Sircello.

Even if we reject the Wollheimian reading of Collingwood as an Idealist in the ontology of art, it remains puzzling how his non-Idealist ontology fits with his idea of art as expression. In trying to clarifying these matters, I argue that (i) the work of art, for Collingwood, is an activity, not the product of an activity; (ii) puzzling features of the Principles arise from attempts to reconcile this claim with the idea of art as expression while preserving the art/craft distinction; and (iii) Collingwood's principal concern in the Principles is with the role of imagination in experience. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?