Abstract

The central question addressed in this work is, 'What ontological commitments are entailed by accepting the standard quantum-mechanical formalism as a theoretical framework within which to construct a descriptively adequate physical world picture?' Arguments in recent literature concerning the ontology of quantum mechanics have made claims regarding the indistinguishability and individuality of quantum particles--viz., that quantum particles are indistinguishable in principle and lack any individual identity--as well as the non-separability of quantum systems--viz., that quantum systems cannot be spatially individuated and exhibit inherent or non-supervenient relations. The first theme of this work is that these arguments make certain presuppositions--especially regarding the completeness of quantum mechanics, the criteria of attributing properties to systems, and the metaphysics of individuality--that are not demanded by either logical consistency or empirical adequacy; thus, some of those assumptions may be reasonably rejected, in which case one need not be committed to all of the above conclusions. The second theme is that such interpretive presuppositions, motivated by neither logic nor experiment alone, operate effectively as methodological criteria of theory selection; hence, by rejecting them one opens up possibilities for alternative interpretations of the standard theoretical formalism that have different ontological commitments. The orthodox, modal, and Bohmian interpretations are considered in particular, and their respective options for ontological commitment concerning the above issues are laid out in detail. This then raises the question of the comparative appraisal of these competing interpretations and their respective ontological commitments. The comparative appraisal of the two chief rival interpretations, the orthodox and Bohmian interpretations, is taken up at length. The case is made here that the Bohmian interpretation better exemplifies certain theoretical virtues, satisfies standard criteria of theoretical progress, and fulfills the traditional aim of physical theory than does the orthodox interpretation. Finally, it is argues that the "price" of the Bohmian interpretation--viz., non-locality--is not unreasonable given the results achieved