A New Approach to the Parmenides’ Revelation

Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 2 (1):7-11 (2018)
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Abstract

The author wishes to show that in Parmenides’ approach, the Aristotelian division of being and the truth still do not exist: being as presence or an object in general, individual or universal, material or mental, and the truth as the value of the judgment, because for the Eleatic word ‘to eon’ only means the truth. This word is the name of the truth as a transcendent nature in general. In his poem Parmenides, for whom the truth is the only Being, praises and describes the existence of the truth in opposition to the multitude of opinions. Parmenides’ poem is the testimony and account of experience of the truth as Being itself, and the experience of its normative force as transcendent nature. This Parmenidean ‘aletheism’ allows us to understand how Plato’s theory of eternal truths ever appeared, as well as the importance of Parmenides himself for Neo-platonism.

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