Strengthened impairment argument does not restate Marquis

Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (12):841-842 (2021)
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Abstract

With Perry Hendricks, I recently outlined a strengthened version of the impairment argument for the immorality of abortion. Alex Gillham has argued that our use of Don Marquis’ deprivation of a ‘future-like ours’ account entails we were merely restating Marquis’ argument for the immorality of abortion. Here, I explain why SIA is more than just a reframing of Marquis.

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Reprint years

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10.1136/medethics-2021-107302

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Bruce P. Blackshaw
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

Killing and Impairing Fetuses.Prabhpal Singh - 2022 - The New Bioethics 28 (2):127-138.
Three Problems with the Impairment Argument.William Simkulet - 2022 - Asian Bioethics Review 15 (2):169-179.

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References found in this work

Why abortion is immoral.Don Marquis - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.
Fine-Tuning the Impairment Argument.Bruce Blackshaw & Perry Hendricks - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (9):641-642.

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