[author unknown]
Abstract
The aims and performance of Xerxes' fleet in the period before Thermopylai are mostly taken by students of the invasion as they are set out in Herodotus. A closer look reveals much of interest, as well as some puzzles. In this paper I address in particular the curious mooring which the fleet adopted at the end of its first day's voyage from Therma: πρ⋯κροσσαι ὅρμεον τ⋯ ⋯ς π⋯ντον ⋯π⋯ ⋯κτὼ ν⋯ας, their next intended port of call, and the attempt to circumnavigate Euboia. In offering an explanation of what was happening and why, I am conscious of the sobering advice given for such investigations by Whatley, that ancient campaigns cannot necessarily be reconstructed as if those in charge saw what was best to do and got it done. That advice is now reinforced by Lazenby. Both of them seem to me, however, to underrate the logistical competence of Xerxes' naval high command. Without good logistics no campaign with triremes was even possible.