Abstract

The commonsense understanding of time typically has the following characteristics: time appears to flow, perceived and objective rates of temporal passage may differ, time and change are related, and the past is fixed , the present fleeting, and the future open. I call this the "pre-theoretic understanding of time." This dissertation compares the pre-theoretic understanding with a number of philosophical theories that attempt to explain temporal perception and temporal language. I argue that once philosophical considerations are taken into account, any plausible theory of time will differ significantly from the pre-theoretic conception. ;I begin with an examination of David Hume's and Immanuel Kant's treatment of the composition problem which arises when attempting to explain how temporally separated perceptions can be related so as to form a unified experience. I argue that Hume's empiricist approach is unable to explain this problem, making way for Kant's transcendental idealist solution. A successful theory of time must incorporate Kant's insight that time cannot be attributed to objects independent of any subject. Time at the transcendental level must be ideal. ;Next, I examine John McTaggart's argument that 'past', 'present', and 'future' cannot be consistently attributed to events, thus making time unreal, I reject McTaggart's position, because it requires the pre-theoretic understanding to be a deception. I examine two positions that were developed in response to McTaggart: the A-theory, which explains time through temporal becoming, and the B-theory, which explains time through temporal relations. I reject the A-theory because its rejection of modern relativity theory is too great a sacrifice to make in order to retain the pre-theoretic notion of temporal flow. The position is found to be philosophically and scientifically unacceptable. I conclude that the B-theory of time, though it requires significant modification of the pre-theoretic view, is the best approach towards developing a successful temporal theory. ;Finally, I sketch the direction for a successful temporal theory, which blends Kant's transcendental idealism and the B-theory. I conclude that the pre-theoretic view of temporal flow must be reinterpreted and the view of an open future must be abandoned.