Putting things in contexts

Philosophical Review 112 (2):191-214 (2003)
Thanks to David Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), we all know how to handle indexicals like ‘I’. ‘I’ doesn’t refer to an object simpliciter; rather, it refers to an object only relative to a context. In particular, relative to a context C, ‘I’ refers to the agent of C. Since different contexts can have different agents, ‘I’ can refer to different objects relative to different contexts. For example, relative to a context cwhose agent is Gottlob Frege, ‘I’ refers to Frege; relative to a context 0* whose agent is Alexius..
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-112-2-191
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Stefano Predelli (2008). The Demonstrative Theory of Quotation. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (5):555-572.
Stefano Predelli (2012). Bare-Boned Demonstratives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):547-562.

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