Abstract

The primary purposes of my dissertation are, first, to motivate Russellian theories of propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions by criticizing Fregean theories, and second, to defend Russellian theories from the arguments and problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity. A theory of propositional attitudes and propositional attitude ascriptions is Russellian just in case it respects both the Principle of Direct Reference, and the Principle of Semantic Innocence. The Principle of Direct Reference states, roughly, that the sole contribution a referring term makes toward the content expressed by a sentence in which the term appears is the referent of the term, and not a Fregean sense or a "way of thinking of the referent of the term." And the Principle of Semantic Innocence states, roughly, that a term has the same referent or designation regardless of whether the term occurs inside or outside of the that-clause of an attitude ascription. Fregean theories, on the other hand, are theories based upon Frege's theory of sense and reference, and thus Fregean theories respect neither the Principle of Direct Reference, nor the Principle of Semantic Innocence. Fregean theories are often alleged to be superior to Russellian theories, however, on the grounds that Fregean theories can avoid the arguments and problems posed by the phenomenon of opacity. I argue that this allegation is false