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Subcategories:History/traditions: Propositional Attitudes
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  1. Tuomo Aho (2003). Propositional Attitudes. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 80 (1):201-221.
    Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on (...)
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  2. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (1996). Science and the Attitudes: A Reply to Sanford. Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):187-189.
    Explaining Attitudes was not intended to be hostile to science. Its target is what I called the Standard View, a conception of the attitudes that is held almost universally. The heart of the Standard View is the thesis that beliefs (and other..
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    Explaining Attitudes offers a timely and important challenge to the dominant conception of belief found in the work of such philosophers as Dretske and Fodor. According to this dominant view beliefs, if they exist at all, are constituted by states of the brain. Lynne Rudder Baker rejects this view and replaces it with a quite different approach - practical realism. Seen from the perspective of practical realism, any argument that interprets beliefs as either brain states or states of immaterial souls (...)
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  5. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1985). Shifting Situations and Shaken Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (1):105--161.
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  6. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
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  7. Richard Bradley (2008). Comparing Evaluations. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part1):85-100.
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  8. John Broome (1991). Desire, Belief and Expectation. Mind 100 (2):265-267.
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  9. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Wright on the McKinsey Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):385-391.
    The McKinsey Problem concerns a puzzling implication of the doctrines of Content Externalism and Privileged Access. I provide a categorization of possible solutions to the problem. Then I discuss Crispin Wright’s work on the problem. I argue that Wright has misconceived the status of his own proferred solution to the problem.
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  10. Delilah Caldwell (2009). The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):812 – 816.
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  11. Roberto Casati & Elena Pasquinelli (2007). How Can You Be Surprised? The Case for Volatile Expectations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):171-183.
    Surprise has been characterized has an emotional reaction to an upset belief having a heuristic role and playing a criterial role for belief ascription. The discussion of cases of diachronic and synchronic violations of coherence suggests that surprise plays an epistemic role and provides subjects with some sort of phenomenological access to their subpersonal doxastic states. Lack of surprise seems not to have the same epistemic power. A distinction between belief and expectation is introduced in order to account for some (...)
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  12. Quassim Cassam (2010). Judging, Believing and Thinking. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):80-95.
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  13. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987). Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing. Philosophical Perspectives 1:405-454.
  14. Lenny Clapp (2002). Davidson's Program and Interpreted Logical Forms. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (3):261-297.
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  15. Sean Crawford (2008). Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes: Quine Revisited. Synthese 160 (1):75 - 96.
    Quine introduced a famous distinction between the ‘notional’ sense and the ‘relational’ sense of certain attitude verbs. The distinction is both intuitive and sound but is often conflated with another distinction Quine draws between ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’ (or higher degree) attitudes. I argue that this conflation is largely responsible for the mistaken view that Quine’s account of attitudes is undermined by the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Quine’s system is also supposed to suffer from the (...)
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  16. Sean Crawford (1999). The Nature of Commonsense Psychological Explanation. Dissertation, University of Oxford
  17. Mark Crimmins (1992). Context in the Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (2):185 - 198.
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  18. Donald Davidson (1968). On Saying That. Synthese 19 (1-2):130-146.
  19. Willem deVries, Sellars, Animals, and Thought. Problems From Sellars.
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  20. Walter Edelberg (1992). Intentional Identity and the Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (6):561 - 596.
  21. Hartry Field (2001). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press.
    Presenting a selection of thirteen essays on various topics at the foundations of philosophy--one previously unpublished and eight accompanied by substantial new postscripts--this book offers outstanding insight on truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes; semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of "factual defectiveness;" and issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. It will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.
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  22. Donald Fisher (1909). Common Sense and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (12):316-323.
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  23. Graeme Forbes (2000). Objectual Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2):141-183.
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  24. Alfred Freddoso, I Feel What You Think.
    Psychological ascriptions are most commonly understood to be Machiavellian and objective (Dennett 1987, Fodor 1987, Heal 1986, Whiten & Byrne 1988). We ascribe thoughts, feelings, and desires to others to better understand them. Since we must cooperate, compete, or simply co-exist with others, the more we know about their psychology the better. Being aimed at understanding others—in relative independence from us—psychological ascriptions are objective. Such ascriptions are also Machiavellian to the extent that their ultimate aim is to help us plan (...)
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  25. John Gibbons (2001). Knowledge in Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):579-600.
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  26. David Landy (2005). Inside Doubt: On the Non-Identity of the Theory of Mind and Propositional Attitude Psychology. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.
    Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a drastic improvement in (...)
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  27. Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray (1998). Semantics for Opaque Contexts. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):141--66.
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  28. Emar Maier, Why My I is Your You: On the Communication of de Se Attitudes.
    The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant- neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. I argue that when we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. To prove this (...)
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  29. Friederike Moltmann (2003). Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions. Synthese 135 (1):77 - 118.
    The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be (...)
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  30. Daniel Nolan (2006). Selfless Desires. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):665-679.
    final version in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2006 73.3: 665-679.
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  31. Dan Ryder, Models in the Brain (Book Summary).
    The central idea is that the cerebral cortex is a model building machine, where regularities in the world serve as templates for the models it builds. First it is shown how this idea can be naturalized, and how the representational contents of our internal models depend upon the evolutionarily endowed design principles of our model building machine. Current neuroscience suggests a powerful form that these design principles may take, allowing our brains to uncover deep structures of the world hidden behind (...)
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  32. Lionel Shapiro (forthcoming). Linguistic Function and Content: Reflections on Price's Pragmatism. Philosophical Quarterly.
    Huw Price proposes a strategy for dissolving ontological puzzles through a pragmatist account of our conceptual activity. Here I consider the proper place for conceptual content in Price’s pragmatism. Price himself rules out any explanatory role for content, just as he rules out any explanatory role for representational notions such as reference and truth. I argue that the cases are disanalogous and that he offers no good reasons for avoiding explanatory appeal to content. Furthermore, I argue that doing so is (...)
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  33. Neil Sinhababu (forthcoming). Advantages of Propositionalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Propositionalism is the view that the contents of intentional attitudes have a propositional structure. Objectualism opposes propositionalism in allowing the contents of these attitudes to be ordinary objects or properties. Philosophers including Talbot Brewer, Paul Thagard, Michelle Montague, and Alex Grzankowski attack propositionalism about such attitudes as desire, liking, and fearing. This paper defends propositionalism, mainly on grounds that it better supports psychological explanations.
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  34. Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Getting a Grip on Emotional Modes. In Alix Cohen & Robert Stern (eds.), Thinking About The Emotions: A Philosophical History. Oxford.
The Language of Thought
  1. Barbara Abbott (1995). Thinking Without English. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):49 - 55.
    Abbott replies to each of Hauser's arguments. Problem solving by chimpanzees and evidence of recursion in the thought of a feral human being suggest that natural language is not necessary for productive thought. Communication would be trivial if the inner language were the outer language, but it is not. The decryption analogy Hauser uses is flawed, and it is not clear which way Occam's razor cuts.
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  2. Laird Addis (1990). The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language. Review of Metaphysics 44 (2):426-427.
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  3. Louise M. Antony, What Are You Thinking? Character and Content in the Language of Thought.
  4. Noga Arikha (2005). Deafness, Ideas and the Language of Thought in the Late 1600s. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):233 – 262.
  5. Jay David Atlas, Some Remarks on Jerry Fodor's Arguments for a Language of Thought.
    The arguments that Fodor (1987: 150-52) gives in support of a Language of Thought are apparently straightforward. (1) Linguistic capacities are "systematic", in the sense that if one understands the words 'John loves Mary' one also understands the form of words 'Mary loves John'. In other words, sentences have a combinatorial semantics, because they have constituent structure. (2) If cognitive capacities are systematic in the same way, they must have constituent structure also. Thus there is a Language of Thought. The (...)
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  6. Murat Aydede, Language of Thought Hypothesis: State of the Art.
    The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over representations. Most of the arguments (...)
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  7. Murat Aydede, The Language of Thought Hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. Murat Aydede (2005). Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited. In G. Irzik & G. Guezeldere (eds.), Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer.
    There is a thesis often aired by some philosophers of psychology that syntax is all we need and there is no need to advert to intentional/semantic properties of symbols for purposes of psychological explanation. Indeed, the worry has been present since the first explicit articulation of so-called Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Even Fodor, who has been the most ardent defender of the Language of Thought Hypoth- esis (LOTH) (which requires the CTM), has raised worries about its apparent consequences. The (...)
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  9. Murat Aydede (2005). Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited. In Gurol Irzik & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), Boston Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer.
    I argue that Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM) and a naturalistic narrow content functionalism run on a Language of Though story have the same exact structure. I elaborate on the argument that narrow content functionalism is either irremediably holistic in a rather destructive sense, or else doesn't have the resources for individuating contents interpersonally. So I show that, contrary to his own advertisement, Stich's STM has exactly the same problems (like holism, vagueness, observer-relativity, etc.) that he claims plague content-based (...)
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  10. Murat Aydede (1997). Language of Thought: The Connectionist Contribution. Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not (...)
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  11. Murat Aydede (1995). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. CSLI Technical Report.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical.
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  12. Lynne Rudder Baker (1990). Seeming to See Red. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):121-128.
    In "Understanding the Language of Thought," John Pollock offers a semantics for Mentalese. Along the way, he raises many deep issues concerning, among other things, the indexicality of thought, the relations between thought and communication, the function of 'that'-clauses and the nature of introspection. Regrettably, I must pass over these issues here. Instead, I shall focus on Pollock's views on the nature of appearance and its role in interpreting the language of thought.' I shall examine two aspects of Pollock's views: (...)
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  13. Jon Barwise (1987). Unburdening the Language of Thought. Mind and Language 2 (1):82-96.
  14. Jacob Beck (forthcoming). Sense, Mentalese, and Ontology. Protosociology, 30 (Special Issue: Concepts.
    Modes of presentation are often posited to accommodate Frege’s puzzle. Philosophers differ, however, in whether they follow Frege in identifying modes of presentation with Fregean senses, or instead take them to be formally individuated symbols of “Mentalese”. Building on Fodor, Margolis and Laurence defend the latter view by arguing that the mind-independence of Fregean senses renders them ontologically suspect in a way that Mentalese symbols are not. This paper shows how Fregeans can withstand this objection. Along the way, a clearer (...)
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  15. Ansgar Beckermann (1994). Can There Be a Language of Thought? In G. White, B. Smith & R. Casati (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
    1. Cognitive sciences in a broad sense are simply all those sciences which concern themselves with the analysis and explanation of cognitive capacities and achievements. If one speaks of _cognitive science_ in the singular, however, usually something more is meant. Cognitive science is not only characterized by a specific object of research, but also through a particular kind of explanatory paradigm, i.e. the information processing paradigm. Stillings _et. al. _for example begin their book _Cognitive Science _as follows:
    Cognitive scientists (...)
    The information processing paradigm however, leads directly to the paradigm of symbol processing, because a system can, as it seems, only receive, store and process information if it has at its disposal a system of internal representations or _symbols_, i.e. an internal language in which this information is encoded. At least this appears to be an idea which suggests itself and which Peter Hacker expresses as follows. (shrink)
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  16. José Luis Bermúdez (2003). Thinking Without Words. Oxford University Press.
    Thinking Without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Jose Luis Bermudez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. The book is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior.
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