Abstract

This dissertation traces the development of the concept "greatness of soul" in Greek and Roman thought and literature, both philosophical and non-philosophical, from the fourth century B.C.E. to the last works of Cicero in 44--43 B.C.E. The Greek megalopsuchia and Latin magnitudo animi, which is not always a literal translation of the Greek, harbor an inherent polysemy and ambiguity. Laudable "greatness of soul" can be confused with, and shade over into, blameworthy "arrogance". Special attention is paid to philosophical discourse, particularly Aristotle's Ethics and Cicero's De Officiis, which attempt to define "greatness of soul" as a unitary virtue. I focus on the differing approaches of Aristotle and the Stoics with regard to the motivational apparatus of the great-souled person, the value which he or she places on external "goods", especially honor and glory, and the role which he or she is expected to play in the political community. I also consider the extent to which the concept of "greatness of soul" does, or does not, develop diachronically within Aristotle's writings, and within Stoic ethical thought. Throughout the dissertation, I locate the philosophical conceptions of "greatness of soul" within their social, political, and historical contexts, by consideration of evidence from historical writings, Greek and Roman political oratory, and Greek epigraphic evidence from the Hellenistic Period, and in doing so, I reassess and supplement the previous studies by Gauthier , Kirsche and Knoche