Relevance of winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations

Theory and Decision 56 (1-2):183-192 (2004)
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Abstract

In this paper we study coalitions of indirect stockholders of a company showing that they can have different controlling power, and therefore different relevance in the control problem. We then introduce a suitable classification, and three algorithms to find all the coalitions of all relevances

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