David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 170 (2):289 - 310 (2009)
This paper identifies and criticizes a line of reasoning that has played a substantial role in the widespread rejection of the view that Fodor has dubbed “Concept Atomism”. The line of reasoning is not only fallacious, but its application in the present case rests on a misconception about the explanatory potential of Concept Atomism. This diagnosis suggests the possibility of a new polemical strategy in support of Concept Atomism. The new strategy is more comprehensive than that which defenders of the view, namely Fodor, have employed.
|Keywords||Philosophy Metaphysics Philosophy of Language Logic Epistemology Computer Science, general Philosophy of Science|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Kevan Edwards (2013). Keeping (Direct) Reference in Mind. Noûs 47 (1):342-367.
Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Mind and Language 25 (5):602-611.
Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):401-410.
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