Synthese 170 (2):289 - 310 (2009)
|Abstract||This paper identifies and criticizes a line of reasoning that has played a substantial role in the widespread rejection of the view that Fodor has dubbed “Concept Atomism”. The line of reasoning is not only fallacious, but its application in the present case rests on a misconception about the explanatory potential of Concept Atomism. This diagnosis suggests the possibility of a new polemical strategy in support of Concept Atomism. The new strategy is more comprehensive than that which defenders of the view, namely Fodor, have employed.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
James A. Hampton (2000). Concepts and Prototypes. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):299-307.
Robert D. Rupert (2000). Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor's Theory of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.
Barbara Landau (2000). Concepts, the Lexicon and Acquisition: Fodor's New Challenge. Mind and Language 15 (2-3):319-326.
Kevan Edwards (2010). Concept Referentialism and the Role of Empty Concepts. Mind and Language 25 (1):89-118.
Bradley Rives (2009). The Empirical Case Against Analyticity: Two Options for Concept Pragmatists. Minds and Machines 19 (2):199-227.
Jack M. C. Kwong (2007). Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts? Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):413-434.
Eric Margolis (1998). How to Acquire a Concept. Mind and Language 13 (3):347-369.
Jussi Jylkkä (2009). Why Fodor's Theory of Concepts Fails. Minds and Machines 19 (1):25-46.
A. Levine & Mark H. Bickhard (1999). Concepts: Where Fodor Went Wrong. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):5-23.
Added to index2009-07-13
Total downloads96 ( #6,749 of 549,122 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,740 of 549,122 )
How can I increase my downloads?