David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 71 (5):912-921 (2004)
Many writers claim that human kinds are significantly different from biological and natural kinds. Some suggest that humans kinds are unique because social structures are essential for the etiology of human kinds. Others argue that human cultural evolution is decidedly different from other forms of evolution. In this paper I suggest that the gulf between humans and our biological relatives is not as wide as some argue. There is a taxonomic difference between human and nonhuman organisms, but such factors as social structure and cultural evolution do not distinguish us from many other organisms.
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Citations of this work BETA
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2013). Three Kinds of Social Kinds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2).
Letitia Meynell (2012). Evolutionary Psychology, Ethology, and Essentialism (Because What They Don't Know Can Hurt Us). Hypatia 27 (1):3-27.
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