The metaphysics of a logical empiricist

Philosophy of Science 8 (3):320-328 (1941)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

While the members of the school of Logical Empiricism may differ in various details, nearly all of them are opposed to metaphysics on the ground that a scientific metaphysics is the only possible one. All philosophy is to become scientific. This assumption is based on their epistemological criterion of verifiability which appears to be a basic doctrine of this school. The implications of this doctrine have not been worked out in detail by many, but one of the most explicit accounts has been given by A. J. Ayer in his book on Language, Truth and Logic, which can be taken as a representative work in its attack on metaphysics.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,574

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
21 (#743,384)

6 months
12 (#223,952)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references