Abstract

U ovom radu analizirano je shvaćanje ljudskog dostojanstva njemačkog pravnog teoretičara Güntera Düriga. Dürigovo tumačenje je desetljećima imalo snažan utjecaj na njemačku pravnu teoriju i ustavnu praksu, a ni s pojavom konkurentskog tumačenja u okviru »Maunz-Düriga« početkom novog milenija Dürigova rješenja nisu pala u zaborav. U radu su razvijene bitne točke, važne filozofske pretpostavke i implikacije Dürigovog tumačenja dostojanstva. Istovremeno je problematizirano njegovo shvaćanje smisla i statusa ljudskog dostojanstva u pravu, odnosa dostojanstva i ljudskih prava, nositelja dostojanstva, odnosa časti, ugleda i dostojanstva, njegova ideja personalne etike, »objekt-formule«, kao i odnosa dostojanstva i slobode.This paper analyses the understanding of human dignity as conceived by Günter Dürig, German legal theorist. For decades his interpretation has had a strong influence on the German legal theory and constitutional practice, and even with the emergence of a rival interpretation in the framework of “Maunz-Dürig” by the beginning of the new millennium, Dürig’s solutions have not been forgotten. The paper develops key points, important philosophical presuppositions and implications of Dürig’s interpretation of dignity. At the same time, his understanding of the meaning and status of human dignity in law is problematized, together with the relationship of dignity and human rights, subjects of dignity, the relationship between honour, reputation and dignity, his idea of personal ethics, “object-formulas”, as well as the relationship between dignity and freedom