Gödel on Concepts

History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (2):171-191 (2006)
Abstract
This article is an attempt to present Gödel's discussion on concepts, from 1944 to the late 1970s, in particular relation to the thought of Frege and Russell. The discussion takes its point of departure from Gödel's claim in notes on Bernay's review of ?Russell's mathematical logic?. It then retraces the historical background of the notion of intension which both Russell and Gödel use, and offers some grounds for claiming that Gödel consistently considered logic as a free-type theory of concepts, called intensions, considered as the denotations of predicate names
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,802
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
P. Cassou-Nogues (2009). Gödel's Introduction to Logic in 1939. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):69-90.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-08-10

Total downloads

26 ( #70,187 of 1,099,750 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #66,740 of 1,099,750 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.