Abstract

This dissertation addresses the issue of the correct analysis of the concept of logically-correct argument. Several analyses are distinguished and evaluated, and one is found to be superior to the rest. ;Say that an argument is correct if and only if it does not have both all true premises and a false conclusion. Say that an argument is modally-correct if and only if, necessarily, it is correct. It is argued that arguments ".. Quine is not a turnip", ".. Quine is not Kripke" and ".. Possibly, Quine is a logician" are modally-correct but not logically-correct, and thus that modal-correctness is not sufficient for logical-correctness. ;Say that an argument A is schematically-modally-correct if and only if every argument which is an instance of A's logical-form is modally-correct. Schematic-modal-correctness avoids the counterexamples to sufficiency given above. However, schematic-modal-correctness fails to be necessary for logical-correctness, for "Quine is Quine.. At least one object is Quine" and "Actually, Quine is a logician.. Quine is a logician", although logically-correct, are not schematically-modally-correct since they are not modally-correct at all. No analysis which entails the modal-correctness of logically-correct arguments is correct. ;Say that an argument A is schematically-correct if and only if every argument which is an instance A's logical-form is correct. It is argued that ".. At least two objects exist" is schematically-correct but not logically-correct, and thus that schematic-correctness is not sufficient for logical-correctness. ;Say that an argument is modally-schematically-correct if and only if, necessarily, it is schematically-correct. Of those considered, this concept is advocated as the best analysis of logical-correctness. Consequences of adopting this analysis are explored, principle among these being that modal-schematic-correctness yields, and thus provides a philosophical rational for the odities of, standard predicate logic with identity