Abstract
The present study compares the philosophy of Leibniz with Heidegger’s thought, in particular his analysis of the principium reddendae rationis sufficientis, the so-called principle of reason: nihil est sine ratione. Early on, the author notes that this version of what Leibniz referred to, in 1686, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld as “my great principle” was for Leibniz merely a “vulgar axiom,” the fundamental form of which “[is that] whereby one can always account for why something has happened this way rather than in some other way”. Heidegger, for his part, finds philosophical meat precisely in the modifying phrase “[in] this way rather than in some other way,” not in the traditional “axiom” that “nothing is without a reason”. Although Leibniz does not give the principium in its pure form in the text cited by Cristin, we are to understand that it is a metaphysical principle, not a logical principle. It is not, however, the principle of causality, which demands an answer to the question about why things are, but rather an ontological principle, which shows that and how things are as they are and not otherwise. The foundation of things, which is expressed in Leibniz’s “great principle,” is like the rose spoken of in a line from Johannes Scheffler’s Cherubinischer Wandersmann that Heidegger admired so much: “The rose is without a ‘why’; it blooms because [weil] it blooms”. Like the rose, the nature of the foundation is not gained by asking “Why?” Yet how can that be? What is more fundamental than asking about etiology, reasons, or grounds? In Der Satz vom Grund [The Principle of Ground], a lecture course from 1955/56, Heidegger replies: “The Why [Warum] looks for [sucht] the foundation. The While [Weil] brings about [bringt] the foundation”. Incidentally, when Heidegger makes a noun from the adverb “weil” in this text, he restores the original meaning of the adverb, which is an abbreviated form of “dieweil,” meaning a span of time. In so doing, he points to the temporal nature of the foundation. We can now better understand how, for Heidegger, the principle of the foundation should not be understood as a proposition or utterance, but rather as something like a tempo marking that leads thinking along its path.