David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. 150-203 (2008)
Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) quotably wrote in 1929 that “the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”1 The same could be said, perhaps with even greater accuracy, of the twentieth-century Euro-American philosophical tradition and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).2 In this sense the twentieth century was the post-Kantian century. Twentieth-century philosophy in Europe and the USA was dominated by two distinctive and (after 1945) officially opposed traditions: the analytic tradition and the phenomenological tradition. Very simply put, the analytic tradition was all about logic and analyticity,3 and the phenomenological tradition was all about consciousness and intentionality.4 (See also “The birth of analytic philosophy,” Chapter 1; “The development of analytic philosophy: Wittgenstein and after,” Chapter 2; “American philosophy in the twentieth century,” Chapter 5; and “Phenomenology,” Chapter 15.) Ironically enough however, despite their official Great Divide, both the analytic and the phenomenological traditions were essentially continuous and parallel critical developments from an earlier dominant neo-Kantian tradition. This, by the end of the nineteenth century had vigorously reasserted the claims of Kant’s transcendental idealism against Hegel’s absolute idealism and the other major systems of post-Kantian German Idealism, under the unifying slogan “Back to Kant!” So again ironically enough, both the analytic and phenomenological traditions were alike founded on, and natural outgrowths from, Kant’s Critical Philosophy. By the end of the twentieth century however, and this time sadly rather than ironically, both the analytic and phenomenological traditions had not only explicitly rejected their own Kantian foundations and roots but also had effectively undermined themselves philosophically, even if by no means institutionally..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Juliet Floyd & Sanford Shieh (eds.) (2001). Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Paul Redding (2007). Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought. Cambridge University Press.
Wayne M. Martin (2006). Theories of Judgment: Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology. Cambridge University Press.
Paul Livingston (2006). Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century - a Review. Inquiry 49 (3):290 – 311.
Robert Hanna, (3) Kant, Science, and Human Nature (Oxford: OUP, 2006). (2) Rationality and Logic (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009). (1) Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (2004). [REVIEW]
Peter Hylton (1990). Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Donald Palmer (2009). Looking at Philosophy: The Unbearable Heaviness of Philosophy Made Lighter. Mcgraw-Hill.
P. M. S. Hacker (1996/1997). Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy. Blackwell.
Sami Pihlström (2003). Pragmatistic Influences in Twentieth Century Finnish Philosophy: From Pre-Analytic to Post-Analytic Thought. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 80 (1):511-535.
Added to index2009-09-03
Total downloads124 ( #6,913 of 1,096,811 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #273,068 of 1,096,811 )
How can I increase my downloads?