Abstract

This article attempts to clarify and critically to discuss some variants of the sociological Interpretation of regularities in social action. The widely held view that the concept of norm yields the decisive approach to a specifically sociological understanding of behavioural regularities is placed in opposition to Weber’s reflections on the basic concepts of sociology. Weber from the start reserves room for an utility - and interestoriented component of explanation, apart from the concept of norm and in principle not less important. In this connection the article also works out and criticises Parsons' attempt to ‘integrate’ Weber's sociology into a normativistic conception of the discipline. As o consequence of this criticism the author stresses the value of using the concept of norm - and also tho of rule - in o more differentiated fashion. In particular we should distinguish clearly between on the one hand norms, or rules with obligatory components, and on the other utility- or means -ends-oriented rules, followed in the process of furthering one’s own interests. If we neglect this distinction and, like Parsons, subsume o conflation of these concepts under the notion of norm, we run the risk of perceiving any moderately polished and strategically prudent pursuit of an agent’s own interests as a case of norm-governed action.