Two types of inductive analogy by similarity

Erkenntnis 21 (1):63 - 87 (1984)
Abstract
In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits
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A. Hill & J. B. Paris (2013). An Analogy Principle in Inductive Logic. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1293-1321.
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