Dignified Animals: How "Non-Kantian" is Nussbaum's Conception of Dignity?

Abstract

Martha Nussbaum’s conception of dignity is integral to her capabilities approach. She argues that dignity is rooted in the flourishing and striving of animals. Her view is distinct from Kant’s, as Kant claims that persons have dignity in virtue of their rational nature. Though Nussbaum’s conception of dignity is important to her approach, its exact content and its relation to her thought is not clearly stated in her work, and I will attempt to provide an overview of Nussbaum’s conception of dignity. Also I will compare and contrast Nussbaum’s dignity with Kant’s. Nussbaum provides four reasons for why her approach is superior to the Kantian split between rationality and animality, all of which I will examine. Finally, I will look at three areas of Nussbaum’s theory which require further exploration.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,571

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Nussbaum, Kant, and the Capabilities Approach to Dignity.Paul Formosa & Catriona Mackenzie - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):875-892.
Dignity, Capability, and Profound Disability.John Vorhaus - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (3):462-478.
By.Craig Duncan - manuscript
Capability without dignity?Joseph J. Fischel & Claire McKinney - 2020 - Contemporary Political Theory 19 (3):404-429.
Martha Nussbaum on animal rights.Anders Schinkel - 2008 - Ethics and the Environment 13 (1):pp. 41-69.
Kantian Ethics, Dignity and Perfection.Paul Formosa - 2017 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Beyond 'compassion and humanity': Justice for nonhuman animals.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2004 - In Cass R. Sunstein & Martha Craven Nussbaum (eds.), Animal rights: current debates and new directions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 299--320.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-07-03

Downloads
4 (#1,617,429)

6 months
2 (#1,193,798)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?