The nature of mathematical objects
In Bonnie Gold & Roger Simons (eds.), Proof and Other Dilemmas: Mathematics and Philosophy. Mathematical Association of America (2008)
| Abstract | On the face of it, platonism seems very far removed from the scientific world view that dominates our age. Nevertheless many philosophers and mathematicians believe that modern mathematics requires some form of platonism. The defense of mathematical platonism that is both most direct and has been most influential in the analytic tradition in philosophy derives from the German logician-philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848-1925).2 I will therefore refer to it as Frege’s argument. This argument is part of the background of any contemporary discussion of mathematical platonism. | |||||||||
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Mark Balaguer, Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Clevis Headley (1997). Platonism and Metaphor in the Texts of Mathematics: GöDel and Frege on Mathematical Knowledge. Man and World 30 (4):453-481.
Mark Balaguer (1995). A Platonist Epistemology. Synthese 103 (3):303 - 325.
Charles Parsons (2008). Mathematical Thought and its Objects. Cambridge University Press.
Mark Balaguer (1998). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Mary Leng (2005). Platonism and Anti-Platonism: Why Worry? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):65 – 84.
Øystein Linnebo (2009). Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
David Liggins (2008). Quine, Putnam, and the 'Quine-Putnam' Indispensability Argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1):113 - 127.
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