A Potential Perspective for Potential Perspectivism—Reply to Fassio

Ethics 133 (1):122-132 (2022)
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Abstract

This discussion article replies to a challenge for potential perspectivism raised by Davide Fassio in this journal. Potential Perspectivism holds that what one ought to do depends on facts that are potentially accessible. Fassio argues against potential perspectivism based on cases of conjunction agglomeration failure of facts that are potentially accessible. I offer a refined account of potential perspectivism that handles cases of conjunction agglomeration failure by spelling out the notion of a potential perspective in terms of sets. This account of potential perspectivism comes to plausible verdicts about what one ought to do in a wide range of cases.

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Andy Mueller
Goethe University Frankfurt

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Things That Make Things Reasonable.John Gibbons - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):335-361.

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