A. C. Michalos' "postulates of rational preference"

Philosophy of Science 37 (4):618-619 (1970)
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Abstract

In an article in this journal [2], A. C. Michalos, while arguing for the normative and empirical inadequacy of the Von Neumann and Morgenstern postulates of rational preference, completely misconstrued the concept of simple additivity contained in the postulates. As a result, the following argument is a non-sequitur.

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Postulates of rational preference.Alex C. Michalos - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (1):18-22.

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