Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes

Theory and Decision 25 (2):193-208 (1988)
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Abstract

It is well-known that different social choice procedures often result in different choice sets. The article focuses on how often this is likely to happen in impartial cultures. The focus is on Borda count, plurality method, max-min method and Copeland's procedure. The probabilities of Condorcet violations of the Borda count and plurality method are also reported. Although blatantly false as a descriptive hypothesis, the impartial culture assumption can be given an interpretation which makes the results obtained in impartial cultures particularly significant, viz. the probabilities of deviations in choice sets indicate how far apart are the intuitions underlying various choice procedures.

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Hannu J. Nurmi
University of Turku

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On the difficulty of making social choices.Hannu Nurmi - 1995 - Theory and Decision 38 (1):99-119.

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