Exploitation and peacekeeping: introducing more sophisticated interactions to the iterated prisoner's dilemma
|Abstract||– We present a new paradigm extending the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma to multiple players. Our model is unique in granting players information about past interactions between all pairs of players – allowing for much more sophisticated social behaviour. We provide an overview of preliminary results and discuss the implications in terms of the evolutionary dynamics of strategies|
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