Abstract

In the Science of Logic, Hegel criticizes Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre for advancing from the beginning through external reflection and thus failing to understand both the nature of the beginning and the proper method to advance from it. This article shows that Fichte's advance from the beginning preempts Hegel's critique and shares Hegel's premises with respect to the method of advancing. The author first analyzes Hegel's critique of Fichte in the Science of Logic, which he follows by showing that Fichte levels a similar critique against Schelling's conception of the beginning set out in his system of 1801. Turning to the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/5, the author then demonstrates that Fichte's method of advancing from the beginning addresses every point of Hegel's critique. He concludes by identifying the similarity and difference between Fichte's and Hegel's methods of advancing.