A Response to William C. Frederick

The Ruffin Series of the Society for Business Ethics 4:177-188 (2004)
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Abstract

This paper addresses the inherent danger of relativism in any naturalistic theory about moral decision-making and action. The implications of Frederick’s naturalistic view of corporations can easily lead one to believe that it has become impossible for theevolutionary firm (EF) to act with moral responsibility. However, if Frederick’s naturalistic account is located within the context of hisand other writers’ insights about complexity science, it may become possible to maintain a sense of creative, pragmatic moral decision-making in the face of supposedly deterministic forces. Business’s most creative response to moral dilemmas takes place “at the edge of chaos,” where a temporary order comes into being via self-organization. This process of self-organization is influenced by a great number of variables. Some of these variables are the x-factor configurations of individuals and groups, which cannot necessarilydetermine, but can influence the moral-decision-making process. Moral responsibility becomes part of a complex process throughwhich creative, value-driven solutions emerge.

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