A dynamic logic of action

Abstract
The paper presents a logical treatment of actions based on dynamic logic. This approach makes it possible to reflect clearly the differences between static and dynamic elements of the world, a distinction which seems crucial to us for a representation of actions.Starting from propositional dynamic logic a formal system (DLA) is developed, the programs of which are used to model action types. Some special features of this system are: Basic aspects of time are incorporated in DLA as far as they are needed for our purpose. Names for states and for instants are simulated by formulas. It is possible to express formally that a formula is satisfiable or valid. A special program is introduced to reflect developments which are not caused by an official agent but by external influences.
Keywords Propositional dynamic logic  logic of action  representation of time  indeterminism  results of actions  abilities  parallel performances
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References found in this work BETA
Mark A. Brown (1990). Action and Ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (1):95 - 114.
Mark A. Brown (1988). On the Logic of Ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (1):1 - 26.
Donald Davidson (1971). Agent, Action, and Reason. In Robert Binkley, Richard Bronaugh & Ausonio Marras (eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason. University of Toronto Press.

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