Abstract

Typically, integrity is said to be a matter of acting in a way that coheres with one's commitments. Certainly, behavior that is consistent with commitments is a central feature of integrity; it is not, however exhaustive of a proper conception. Reflecting on the "purpose" of integrity is useful in illustrating why this is the case: integrity matters because it is one way of measuring moral identity. Our moral identity is composed of more than just behavior and commitments--our emotions are also a component of moral identity. ;It is argued that integrity is properly conceived as a virtue. Phillipa Foot's account of a virtue is taken as a starting point. Her discussion of virtues make clear that an agent's emotions are importantly related to virtues. Thus, her account is helpful in articulating the relationship between emotions and integrity. ;Foot's conception of virtue is used as a critical point of reference in evaluating extant accounts of integrity. The work of both Gabrielle Taylor and Bernard Williams is critically examined. It is argued that each fails to explain the sense in which integrity is a virtue, albeit in different ways. Taylor's account cannot speak to the centrality of emotion in forming commitments, while Williams' account fails to attend to how it is that integrity is morally beneficial. ;The foundation for a new conception of integrity is sketched. This account makes use of psychodynamic theory, specifically the the work of Heinz Kohut, and suggests that integrity is a matter both of what makes a person unique as well as what is held in common with the set of persons. A case is made that such an account meets the criteria specified for a virtue