Evolutionary Epistemology and the Aim of Science

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):209-225 (2010)
Abstract
Both Popper and van Fraassen have used evolutionary analogies to defend their views on the aim of science, although these are diametrically opposed. By employing Price's equation in an illustrative capacity, this paper considers which view is better supported. It shows that even if our observations and experimental results are reliable, an evolutionary analogy fails to demonstrate why conjecture and refutation should result in: (1) the isolation of true theories; (2) successive generations of theories of increasing truth-likeness; (3) empirically adequate theories; or (4) successive generations of theories of increasing proximity to empirical adequacy. Furthermore, it illustrates that appeals to induction do not appear to help. It concludes that an evolutionary analogy is only sufficient to defend the notion that the aim of science is to isolate a particular class of false theories, namely those that are empirically inadequate.
Keywords Evolutionary Epistemolgy  Popper  Van Fraassen  Aim of Science  Scientific Realism  Constructive Empiricism
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DOI 10.1080/00048400903367866
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Moti Mizrahi (2014). Constructive Empiricism: Normative or Descriptive? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (4):604-616.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2010). What Scientific Progress Is Not: Against Bird's Epistemic View. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):241-255.

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