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Siblings:History/traditions: Evolutionary Epistemology
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  1. Joseph Agassi (1974). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Philosophia 4 (1):163-201.
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  2. F. Michael Akeroyd (2004). Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology Revamped. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (2):385 - 396.
    In a paper entitled “Revolution in Permanence”, published in the collection “Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems”, John Worrall (1995) severely criticised several aspects of Karl Popper’s work before commenting that “I have no doubt that, given suffi-cient motivation, a case could be constructed on the basis of such remarks that Popper had a more sophisticated version of theory production......” (p. 102). Part of Worrall’s criticism is directed at a “strawpopper”: in his “Darwinian Model” emphasising the similarities and differences between genetic (...)
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  3. Barry Allen (1997). Knowledge and Adaptation. Biology and Philosophy 12 (2):233-241.
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  4. Claes Andersson (2008). Sophisticated Selectionism as a General Theory of Knowledge. Biology and Philosophy 23 (2):229-242.
    Human knowledge is a phenomenon whose roots extend from the cultural, through the neural and the biological and finally all the way down into the Precambrian “primordial soup.” The present paper reports an attempt at understanding this Greater System of Knowledge (GSK) as a hierarchical nested set of selection processes acting concurrently on several different scales of time and space. To this end, a general selection theory extending mainly from the work of Hull and Campbell is introduced. The perhaps most (...)
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  5. Oleg E. Backsansky (2013). The Biological Roots of Knowledge. Dialogue and Universalism 18 (11/12):227-231.
    An inspection into the contemporary theory of knowledge shows that a new methodological stance, that is, the so called evolutionary epistemology or, equivalently, evolutionary theory of knowledge, which is a version of “naturalistic” turn has been established. This stance tends to consider various philosophical problems from concrete scientific positions and by means of scientific knowledge. This interdisciplinary enterprise has determined as its purposes the researches of biological preconditions of human knowledge and the explanation of its features on the basis of (...)
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  6. Brian Baigrie (1988). Why Evolutionary Epistemology is an Endangered Theory. Social Epistemology 2 (4):357 – 369.
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  7. William Bechtel (1988). New Insights Into the Nature of Science: What Does Hull's Evolutionary Epistemology Teach Us? [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 3 (2):157-164.
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  8. James Blachowicz (1995). Elimination, Correction and Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (1):5 – 17.
    Abstract Evolutionary epistemologists from Popper to Campbell have appropriated the Darwinian principle to explain the apparent fit between the world and our knowledge of it. I argue that this strategy suffers from the lack of any principled distinction among various types of elimination. I offer such a distinction and show that there is a species of elimination that is really corrective, that is, which violates the Darwinian principle as Popper understands it.
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  9. Steven Bland (2013). Scepticism, Relativism, and the Structure of Epistemic Frameworks. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):539-544.
    This paper has four aims: first, to outline the role of the sceptical problem of the criterion in the principal argument for epistemic relativism; second, to establish that methodist and particularist responses to the problem of the criterion do not, by themselves, constitute successful strategies for resisting epistemic relativism; third, to argue that a more fruitful strategy is to attempt to evaluate epistemic frameworks on the basis of the epistemic resources that they have in common; and finally, to make the (...)
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  10. Margaret A. Boden (1990). Evolutionary Epistemology. Synthese 85:185-197.
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  11. Tomas Bogardus (2016). Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument. Ethics 126 (3):636-661.
    Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work (...)
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  12. Alisa Bokulich & William J. Devlin (2015). Kuhn’s Social Epistemology and the Sociology of Science. In William J. Devlin & Alisa Bokulich (eds.), Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On. Springer 167-183.
    This chapter discusses Kuhn’s conception of the history of science by focussing on two respects in which Kuhn is an historicist historian and philosopher of science. I identify two distinct, but related, aspects of historicism in the work of Hegel and show how these are also found in Kuhn’s work. First, Kuhn held tradition to be important for understanding scientific change and that the tradition from which a scientific idea originates must be understood in evaluating that idea. This makes Kuhn (...)
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  13. Michael Bradie, Evolutionary Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  14. Michael Bradie (2006). An Information-Theoretic Approach to Evolutionary Epistemology. [REVIEW] Biological Theory 1 (4):431-433.
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  15. Michael Bradie (1994). Epistemology From an Evolutionary Point of View. In E. Sober (ed.), Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology. The MIT Press. Bradford Books 453--476.
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  16. Michael Bradie (1986). Assessing Evolutionary Epistemology. Biology and Philosophy 1 (4):401-459.
    There are two interrelated but distinct programs which go by the name evolutionary epistemology. One attempts to account for the characteristics of cognitive mechanisms in animals and humans by a straightforward extension of the biological theory of evolution to those aspects or traits of animals which are the biological substrates of cognitive activity, e.g., their brains, sensory systems, motor systems, etc. (EEM program). The other program attempts to account for the evaluation of ideas, scientific theories and culture in general by (...)
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  17. Larry Briskman (1974). Review: Toulmin's Evolutionary Epistemology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):160 - 169.
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  18. James Robert Brown (1985). Rescher's Evolutionary Epistemology. Philosophia 15 (3):287-300.
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  19. Lucrecia Burges (2002). Evolutionary Epistemology: A Clue to Understand Moral Origins. [REVIEW] History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 24 (1):109 - 120.
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  20. Lucrecia Burges (2002). Essay Review: Evolutionary Epistemology: A Clue to Understand Moral Origins. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 24 (1):109-120.
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  21. Wolfgang Buschlinger & Hannes Rusch (2014). Erkenntnis als Ergebnis biologischer Entwicklung: Die Grundzüge der Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie im Überblick. Ethik Und Unterricht 2014 (2):10-14.
    In diesem Artikel stellen wir die Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie kurz vor. Wir gehen dazu in zwei Schritten vor: In Schritt 1 charakterisieren wir die Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie anhand ihrer Antworten auf die Grundfragen an jede Erkenntnistheorie. In Schritt 2 stellen wir all jene philosophischen Positionen dar, mit denen die Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie eng verbunden ist.
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  22. Michael Bycroft (2012). Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (3):425-429.
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  23. Werner Callebaut (1978). Practical Rationality From an Evolutionary Perspective. Philosophica 22.
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  24. Werner Callebaut & R. Pinxten (eds.) (1987). Evolutionary Epistemology: A Multiparadigm Program. Reidel.
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  25. Peter Carruthers, Logan Fletcher & J. Brendan Ritchie, The Evolution of Self-Knowledge.
    Humans have the capacity for awareness of many aspects of their own mental lives—their own experiences, feelings, judgments, desires, and decisions. We can often know what it is that we see, hear, feel, judge, want, or decide. This article examines the evolutionary origins of this form of self-knowledge. Two alternatives are contrasted and compared with the available evidence. One is first-person based: self-knowledge is an adaptation designed initially for metacognitive monitoring and control. The other is third-person based: self-knowledge depends on (...)
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  26. A. F. Chalmers (1974). OPPER, K. R.: "Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach". [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52:70.
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  27. Paola Hernández Chavez (2003). The Normative Demand in Evolutionary Epistemology. Ludus Vitalis 9 (20):108-115.
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  28. Christopher Cherniak (2005). Innateness and Brain-Wiring Optimization. In António Zilhão (ed.), Evolution, Rationality, and Cognition: A Cognitive Science for the Twenty-First Century. Routledge
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  29. V. T. Cheshko, L. V. Ivanitskaya & V. I. Glazko (2016). EVOLUTIONARY RISK OF HIGH HUME TECHNOLOGIES. Article 3. EVOLUTIONARY SEMANTICS AND BIOETHICS. Integrative Annthropology (1):21-27.
    The co-evolutionary concept of three-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctness) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to other ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the vectors of biological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution by two gear mechanism — genetic and cultural co-evolution and techno-humanitarian (...)
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  30. V. T. Cheshko, L. V. Ivanitskaya & V. I. Glazko (2015). EVOLUTIONARY RISK OF HIGH HUME TECHNOLOGIES. Article 2. THE GENESIS AND MECHANISMS OF EVOLUTIONARY RISK. Integrative Anthropology (1):4-15.
    Sources of evolutionary risk for stable strategy of adaptive Homo sapiens are an imbalance of: (1) the intra-genomic co-evolution (intragenomic conflicts); (2) the gene-cultural co-evolution; (3) inter-cultural co-evolution; (4) techno-humanitarian balance; (5) inter-technological conflicts (technological traps). At least phenomenologically the components of the evolutionary risk are reversible, but in the aggregate they are in potentio irreversible destructive ones for biosocial, and cultural self-identity of Homo sapiens. When the actual evolution is the subject of a rationalist control and/or manipulation, the magnitude (...)
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  31. V. T. Cheshko, L. V. Ivanitskaya & V. I. Glazko (2014). EVOLUTIONARY RISK OF HIGH HUME TECHNOLOGIES. Article 1. STABLE ADAPTIVE STRATEGY OF HOMO SAPIENS. Integrative Anthropology (2):4-14.
    Stable adaptive strategy of Homo sapiens (SASH) is a result of the integration in the three-module fractal adaptations based on three independent processes of generation, replication, and the implementation of adaptations — genetic, socio-cultural and symbolic ones. The evolutionary landscape SASH is a topos of several evolutionary multi-dimensional vectors: 1) extraversional projective-activity behavioral intention (adaptive inversion 1), 2) mimesis (socio-cultural inheritance), 3) social (Machiavellian) intelligence, 4) the extension of inter-individual communication beyond their own social groups and their own species in (...)
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  32. Valentin Cheshko, L. V. Ivanitskaya & V. I. Glazko (2011). POST-INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE OF XXI CENTURY – RATIONALISM VERSUS IRRATIONALISM: EVOLUTIONARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT. Russian Academy of Natural Sciences Herald 3:68-77.
    The phenomenon of rationalism and irrationalism, contextually related to the transformation methodology and the social function of modern (post-industrial) science – social verification, interpretation and knowledge, etc., are analyzes.
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  33. Valentin Cheshko & Yulia Kosova (2012). SOCIAL VERIFICATION – HUMAN DIMENSONS OF THEORETICAL SCIENCE AND HIGH-TECH (CASUS BIOETHICS). Part Three. DYNAMICS OF GROWTH OF NEW KNOWLEDGE IN POSTACADEMICAL SCIENCE. Practical Philosophy 1:59-69.
    The new phase of science evolution is characterized by totality of subject and object of cognition and technology (high-hume). As a result, forming of network structure in a disciplinary matrix modern are «human dimensional» natural sciences and two paradigmal «nuclei» (attraktors). As a result, the complication of structure of disciplinary matrix and forming a few paradigm nuclei in modern «human dimensional» natural sciences are observed. In the process of social verification integration of scientific theories into the existent system of mental (...)
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  34. Valentin Cheshko & Yulia Kosova (2012). SOCIAL VERIFICATION – HUMAN DIMENSONS OF THEORETICAL SCIENCE AND HIGH-TECH (CASUS BIOETHICS). Part Three. DYNAMICS OF GROWTH OF NEW KNOWLEDGE IN POSTACADEMICAL SCIENCE. Practical Philosophy 1:59-69.
  35. Valentin Cheshko & Yulia Kosova (2011). SOCIAL VERIFICATION – HUMAN DIMENSONS OF THEORETICAL SCIENCE AND HIGH-TECH (CASUS BIOETHICS). Part One. Practical Philosophy 1:94-100.
    The new phase of science evolution is characterized by totality of subject and object of cognition and technology (high-hume). As a result, forming of network structure in a disciplinary matrix modern are «human dimensional» natural sciences and two paradigmal «nuclei» (attraktors). As a result, the complication of structure of disciplinary matrix and forming a few paradigm nuclei in modern «human dimensional» natural sciences are observed. In the process of social verification integration of scientific theories into the existent system of mental (...)
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  36. Valentin Cheshko & Yulia Kosova (2011). SOCIAL VERIFICATION – HUMAN DIMENSONS OF THEORETICAL SCIENCE AND HIGH-TECH (CASUS BIOETHICS). Part Two. Practical Philosophy 2:46-55.
    The new phase of science evolution is characterized by totality of subject and object of cognition and technology (high-hume). As a result, forming of network structure in a disciplinary matrix modern are «human dimensional» natural sciences and two paradigmal «nuclei» (attraktors). As a result, the complication of structure of disciplinary matrix and forming a few paradigm nuclei in modern «human dimensional» natural sciences are observed.
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  37. Ron Chrisley & Andy Holland, Connectionist Synthetic Epistemology: Requirements for the Development of Objectivity.
    A connectionist system that is capable of learning about the spatial structure of a simple world is used for the purposes of synthetic epistemology: the creation and analysis of artificial systems in order to clarify philosophical issues that arise in the explanation of how agents, both natural and artificial, represent the world. In this case, the issues to be clarified focus on the content of representational states that exist prior to a fully objective understanding of a spatial domain. In particular, (...)
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  38. Wayne D. Christensen & Clifford A. Hooker (1999). The Organization of Knowledge: Beyond Campbell's Evolutionary Epistemology. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):249.
    Donald Campbell has long advocated a naturalist epistemology based on a general selection theory, with the scope of knowledge restricted to vicarious adaptive processes. But being a vicariant is problematic because it involves an unexplained epistemic relation. We argue that this relation is to be explicated organizationally in terms of the regulation of behavior and internal state by the vicariant, but that Campbell's selectionist approach can give no satisfactory account of it because it is opaque to organization. We show how (...)
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  39. A. J. Clark (1986). Evolutionary Epistomology and the Scientific Method. Philosophica 37.
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  40. A. J. Clark (1984). Evolutionary Epistemology and Ontological Realism. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):482-490.
  41. Andrew J. Clark (1983). Meaning and Evolutionary Epistemology. Theoria 49 (1):23-31.
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  42. Justin Clarke-Doane (2012). Morality and Mathematics: The Evolutionary Challenge. Ethics 122 (2):313-340.
    It is commonly suggested that evolutionary considerations generate an epistemological challenge for moral realism. At first approximation, the challenge for the moral realist is to explain our having many true moral beliefs, given that those beliefs are the products of evolutionary forces that would be indifferent to the moral truth. An important question surrounding this challenge is the extent to which it generalizes. In particular, it is of interest whether the Evolutionary Challenge for moral realism is equally a challenge for (...)
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  43. M. Coleman (2002). Taking Simmel Seriously in Evolutionary Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (1):55-74.
    Donald T. Campbell outlines an epistemological theory that attempts to be faithful to evolution through natural selection. He takes his position to be consistent with that of Karl R. Popper, whom he credits as the primary advocate of his day for natural selection epistemology. Campbell writes that neither he nor Popper want to give up the goal of objectivity or objective truth, in spite of their evolutionary epistemology. In discussing the conflict between an epistemology based on natural selection and objective (...)
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  44. P. J. Crittenden (1976). Evolutionary Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 25:228-243.
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  45. Gregory Currie (1978). Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology: A Critique. Synthese 37 (3):413 - 431.
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  46. R. Curtis (1989). Evolutionary Epistemology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (1):95-102.
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  47. Howard Darmstadter (2015). Why We Can't Agree. Philosophy Now (107):26.
    We all have internal models (or maps) that represent the world. But all models/maps distort. Given the complexity of the world and the psychological limits to our representational ability, we must do with simplified models that work in those situations that are most important for us. But since our wants and situations differ, so will our models. When we encounter people with different models, we may try to convert them, but such conversion is unlikely if their models serve their wants (...)
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  48. Alex Stewart Davies (2013). Kuhn on Incommensurability and Theory Choice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (4):571-579.
    The incommensurability of two theories seems to problematize theory comparisons, which allow for the selection of the better of the two theories. If so, it becomes puzzling how the quality of theories can improve with time, i.e. how science can progress across changes in incommensurable theories. I argue that in papers published in the 1990s, Kuhn provided a novel way to resolve this apparent tension between incommensurability and scientific progress. He put forward an account of their compatibility which worked not (...)
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  49. Helen de Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan de Smedt & Stefaan Blancke (2011). Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification. Dialectica 65 (4):517-535.
    What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches (...)
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  50. Rogier De Langhe (2013). The Kuhnian Paradigm. Topoi 32 (1):65-73.
    Kuhn wanted to install a new research agenda in philosophy of science. I argue that the tools are now available to better articulate his paradigm and let it guide philosophical research instead of itself remaining the object of philosophical debate.
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