Contraries and subcontraries

Noûs 2 (1):95-96 (1968)
If two statements are contraries if and only if they cannot both be true, but can both be false, then some corresponding A and E categorical statements are not contraries, even on the presupposition that something exists which satisfies the subject term. For some such statements are necessarily true and thus cannot be false. There is a similar problem with subcontraries.
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DOI 10.2307/2214419
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Lloyd Humberstone (2013). Logical Relations. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):175-230.
Michael V. Wedin (1990). Negation and Quantification in Aristotle. History and Philosophy of Logic 11 (2):131-150.

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