Abstract

In this dissertation it is argued that Kant's critique of Leibniz as found in the amphiboly chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason derives from his theory of reflection. It is argued further that this unfocused and fragmentary amphiboly chapter, which contains the Leibniz-critique, can be seen to have a previously unsuspected unity to it. The keys to perceiving this unity are the appendix's purpose, structure and mosaic composition. ;The primary purpose of the appendix is not to present Kant's criticisms of Leibniz as is commonly thought, but rather it is to sketch his theory of reflection. Not only is this attested to by Kant himself , it is also made evident by the structure of the appendix. Structurally, the appendix is built around an introduction to the operation of transcendental reflection and a discussion of the concepts of reflection, this being the structure of each of the first three sections. By means of each pair of concepts of reflection Kant claims to summarize the basic tenets and origin of Leibniz's philosophy. Kant also claims that Leibnizls whole philosophy rests on one seminal error, which will be shown to be the omission of the operation of transcendental reflection. To be sure, Kant claims Leibniz made a number of other errors, but these various errors all derive from the omission of transcendental reflection. ;While this omission can be used to explain the other more well-known epistemological mistakes with which Kant charges Leibniz, it is undeniable that there are certain textual difficulties with the appendix. These can be dealt with by the hypothesis that the different sections were composed at different times and than pieced together without detailed revisions. If such a mosaic composition is granted, then some allowance can be made for the noticeable incongruities between these sections and for occasional problematic passages. This does not, however, warrant the claim that the appendix is not properly placed or unimportant. On the contrary, supplemented by clearer statements of Kant's theory of reflection and of his Leibniz-critique, the following interpretation shows that the appendix is properly placed and integral to the primary aims of the Critique of Pure Reason