Abstract

In this dissertation I address issues concerning harm and risk of harm that the utilization of technology imposes on people and the environment. I conceptually analyze the relationship between harm, risk of harm, consent to risk harm, and imposed risk of harm. In the first chapter I argue that the most basic harm is an invasion of our environmental rights which are foundational to all other rights. In the second chapter I discuss the justification for, and limits to, the right to take personal risks. I also discuss Bayesian and 'maximin' risk assessments and argue for a risk-averse approach when our environmental rights are at risk. In the third chapter I discuss the standard justification for risking harm, informed consent. Informed consent justifies an agent's risking harm to himself or herself, and is prima facie necessary in order to justify that risk. However, regarding the utilization of technology that by its nature risks harm to more than one person, a single agent is unable to provide the consent necessary to justify the the risks to others. If consent remains necessary to justify risk of harm, then imposed risk is prima facie, unjustifiable. Many of the risks from the utilization of technology are imposed and thus require something beyond traditional consent in order to be justified. I provide a model for justifying imposed technological risk, given certain overriding considerations. In the last chapter, I discuss risky technology in general and examine nuclear power in light of the previous chapters' discussions of harm, risk of harm, consent to risk harm, and imposed risk of harm. I argue that nuclear technology imposes risks to our most basic environmental rights, and as it fails to be justified by the overriding considerations in my model, is a paradigm case of unjustifiable imposed technological risk. I conclude that we need to heed our history of technological harm to the environment, and practice restraint regarding present and future technology