Beliefs supported by binary arguments

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (2-3):165-188 (2018)
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Abstract

In this paper, we explore the relation between an agent’s doxastic attitude and her arguments in support of a given claim. Our main contribution is the design of a logical setting that allows us reason about binary arguments which are either in favour or against a certain claim. This is a setting in which arguments and propositions are the basic building blocks so that the concept of argument-based belief emerges in a straightforward way. We work against the background of Dung’s abstract argumentation framework, extending it to a new setting in which we can study the formal properties of binary arguments as well as the larger structures they establish. This paper introduces a formal ‘two-dimensional’ language to talk about propositions and arguments, for which a sound and complete axiom system is provided.

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Sonja Smets
University of Amsterdam

References found in this work

Modal Logic: Graph. Darst.Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema.
The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Philosophy 34 (130):244-245.
Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction.Johan van Benthem - 2011 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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