David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007)
The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain. Idiomatically we do use ‘She has a good mind’ and ‘She has a good brain’ interchangeably but we would hardly say ‘Her mind weighs fifty ounces’. Here I take identifying mind and brain as being a matter of identifying processes and perhaps states of the mind and brain. Consider an experience of pain, or of seeing something, or of having a mental image. The identity theory of mind is to the effect that these experiences just are brain processes, not merely correlated with brain processes.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini (2016). The Cognitive Neuroscience Revolution. Synthese 193 (5):1509-1534.
John R. Searle (1984). Intentionality and its Place in Nature. Synthese 38 (October):87-100.
Andrew Melnyk (1994). Being a Physicalist: How and (More Importantly) Why. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 74 (2):221-241.
Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman (2011). Towards a Computational Theory of Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):807-827.
Similar books and articles
Clive Vernon Borst (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers. New York,St Martin's P..
Jack H. Ornstein (1972). The Mind and the Brain: A Multi-Aspect Interpretation. The Hague: Nijhoff.
Don A. Merrell (2011). Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):593 - 602.
Norman Malcolm (1964). Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory. Dialogue 3 (2):115-25.
Irving Thalberg (1978). A Novel Approach to Mind-Brain Identity. Philosophy of Science 3 (April):255-72.
Thomas Polger (2004). Natural Minds. MIT Press.
Ullin T. Place (2000). The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation. Brain and Mind 1 (1):29-43.
A. Campbell Garnett (1965). Body and Mind: The Identity Thesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (May):77-81.
W. Teed Rockwell (2005). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
George Pitcher (1960). Sensations and Brain Processes: A Reply to Professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (August):150-7.
David Hunter (2001). Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):366 – 376.
Jan Srzednicki (1972). Some Objections to Mind-Brain Identity Theories. Philosophia 2 (July):205-225.
Mario Beauregard (2012). Brain Wars: The Scientific Battle Over the Existence of the Mind and the Proof That Will Change the Way We Live Our Lives. Harperone.
Barbara Fajardo (2000). Breaks in Consciousness in the Psychoanalytic Process: A Dynamic Systems Approach to Change and a Bridge to Edelman's Mind/Brain Model. Annual of Psychoanalysis 28:21-45.
M. Scheele (2002). Never Mind the Gap: The Explanatory Gap as an Artifact of Naive Philosophical Argument. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):333-342.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads304 ( #8,492 of 1,902,542 )
Recent downloads (6 months)47 ( #8,610 of 1,902,542 )
How can I increase my downloads?