- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Black box inference: When should intervening variables be postulated?
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):469-498 (1998)
Abstract
An empirical procedure is suggested for testing a model that postulates variables that intervene between observed causes and abserved effects against a model that includes no such postulate. The procedure is applied to two experiments in psychology. One involves a conditioning regimen that leads to response generalization; the other concerns the question of whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind.Author's Profile
My notes
Similar books and articles
Causal inference of ambiguous manipulations.Peter Spirtes & Richard Scheines - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):833-845.
Ethical decision making: A review of the empirical literature. [REVIEW]Robert C. Ford & Woodrow D. Richardson - 1994 - Journal of Business Ethics 13 (3):205 - 221.
Quantification without variables in connectionism.John A. Barnden & Kankanahalli Srinivas - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (2):173-201.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
316 (#63,433)
6 months
17 (#145,948)
2009-01-28
Downloads
316 (#63,433)
6 months
17 (#145,948)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
The multiple realizability argument against reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.
Parsimony and models of animal minds.Elliott Sober - 2009 - In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. pp. 237.
Toward a science of other minds: Escaping the argument by analogy.Cognitive Evolution Group, Since Darwin, D. J. Povinelli, J. M. Bering & S. Giambrone - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (3):509-541.
Toward a Science of Other Minds: Escaping the Argument by Analogy.Daniel J. Povinelli, Jesse M. Bering & Steve Giambrone - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (3):509-541.
References found in this work
Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The 'panglossian paradigm' defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
Science and human behavior.B. F. Skinner - 1954 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 144:268-269.
How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less A d Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.Malcolm R. Forster & Elliott Sober - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-35.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-55b469568f-znn98 uwo