Ontological Insecurity and Reflective Processes

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 8 (2):203-217 (1977)
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Abstract

Strong support was found for the ontological model as it was interpreted and according to the procedures used. Reflective subjects are more likely to show anxiety than non-reflective subjects, and anxiety is less likely to be located at those points upon which reflection is deployed than at those points devoid of reflection. Reflective subjects are also more likely to show indications of dissatisfaction than non-reflective subjects; anxious subjects are also more likely to show signs of dissatisfaction than those who are non-anxious. A subanalysis helps to disassociate effects attributable to reflection from effects attributable to dissatisfaction. The "main" effect of reflection on anxiety is that, regardless of whether dissatisfaction is or is not indicated, reflective subjects are more likely to show anxiety than non-reflective subjects. However, the significantly greater likelihood of observing anxiety among dissatisfied reflective than satisfied reflective subjects is indicative of the degree to which dissatisfaction is a source of anxiety beyond that attributable to reflection alone. The higher likelihood of finding anxiety among reflective subjects, independent of the presence or absence of dissatisfaction, is of considerable importance in interpreting the portion of the ontological model bearing uon the regulation of anxiety according

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References found in this work

The Sickness Unto Death.Søen Kierkegaard & Walter Lowrie - 1946 - Princeton University Press.
Many-valued logic.Nicholas Rescher - 1969 - New York,: McGraw-Hill.
The Divided Self, An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness.R. D. Laing - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 15 (3):405-405.
Many-Valued Logic.Nicholas Rescher - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (4):405-406.

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