Catching Berkeley's shadow

Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):116-136 (2011)
Abstract
Berkeley thinks that we only see the size, shape, location, and orientation of objects in virtue of the correlation between sight and touch. Shadows have all of these spatial properties and yet are intangible. In Seeing Dark Things (2008), Roy Sorensen argues that shadows provide a counterexample to Berkeley's theory of vision and, consequently, to his idealism. This paper shows that Berkeley can accept both that shadows are intangible and that they have spatial properties
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    References found in this work BETA
    David Lewis (2004). Void and Object. In John Collins, Ned Hall & L. A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Mit Press. 277-290.

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    Roy Sorensen (2006). Spinning Shadows. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):345 - 365.
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    Rick Grush (2007). Berkeley and the Spatiality of Vision. Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (3):413-442.
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