“I could have been you”: Existential Envy and the Self

In Sara Protasi (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Envy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 77-92 (2022)
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Abstract

This paper explores “existential envy” as a kind of envy in which the subject targets the rival’s entire being rather than one of her possessions, achievements or talents. It argues that existential envy is characterized by a weakening of the distinction between good and rival and by a strong focus on the envious self. In existential envy, the subject becomes aware that another person is closer to her ideal self than she is, such that the rival painfully reminds her of unfulfilled but now unrealizable possibilities inherent to her being. After motivating the topic in the introduction (section 1), the paper analyzes the intentional object of existential envy, i.e., of what it means that the envier targets the other’s being (section 2). The next section explores existential envy’s focus on the self by examining the series of feelings of diminution in the envier’s own value (section 3). The paper then turns to the set of comparisons between the self and the other and the counterfactual thought “I could have been you!” which is shown to be definitory of this type of envy (section 4). In the final part of the paper, the relation between the envier’s bad self-image, self-reproach, and self-deception is discussed (section 5), before the main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 6).

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Author's Profile

Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran
University of Marburg

Citations of this work

Hostile Affective States and Their Self-Deceptive Styles: Envy and Hate.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2023 - In Alba Montes Sánchez & Alessandro Salice (eds.), Emotional Self-Knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge.

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References found in this work

Envy and Self-worth.Timothy Perrine - 2011 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):433-446.

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