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Two-person sequential bargaining behavior with exogenous breakdown
Theory and Decision 32 (3):241-268 (1992)
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Citations of this work
Finite Horizon Bargaining With Outside Options And Threat Points.Randolph Sloof - 2004 - Theory and Decision 57 (2):109-142.
References found in this work
Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.Reinhard Selten - 1975 - International Journal of Game Theory 4:25-55.
Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining.Amnon Rapoport, Eythan Weg & Dan S. Felsenthal - 1990 - Theory and Decision 28 (1):47-71.
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