Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Relative Identity" by Harry Deutsch and Pawel Garbacz
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Anscombe, G.E.M. and P. T. Geach, 1961, Three philosophers: Aristotle; Aquinas; Frege, Ithaca: Cornell Press. (Scholar)
- Baker, L. R., 1997, “Why Constitution is not Identity”, Journal of Philosophy, 94: 599–621. (Scholar)
- Alston, W. and J. Bennett, 1984, “Identity and Cardinality: Geach and Frege”, Philosophical Review, 93: 553–568. (Scholar)
- Blanchette, P., 1999, “Relative Identity and Cardinality”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29: 205–224. (Scholar)
- Borowski, E.J., 1975, “Diachronic Identity as Relative Identity”, Philosophical Quarterly, 25: 271–276. (Scholar)
- Branson, B., 2019, “No new solutions to the logical problem of the Trinity”, Journal of Applied Logics, 6: 1051–1091. (Scholar)
- Burke, M., 1992, “Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account”, Analysis, 52: 12–17. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle”, The Journal of Philosophy, 91(3): 129–139. doi:10.2307/2940990 (Scholar)
- Carmichael, Chad. 2020, “How to Solve the Puzzle of Dion and Theon Without Losing Your Head”, Mind, 129(513): 205–224. (Scholar)
- Carrara, M. and E. Sacchi, 2007, “Cardinality and
Identity”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 36:
539–556. (Scholar)
- Carter, W. R., 1982, “On Contingent Identity and Temporal Worms”, Philosophical Studies, 41: 213–230. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “Contingent Identity and Rigid Designation”, Mind, 96: 250–255. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, Elements of Metaphysics, New York: McGraw-Hill. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, R., 1987, “On the Logical Problem of the
Trinity”, in R. Cartwright, Philosophical Essays,
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- Chandler, H., 1971, “Constitutivity and Identity”, Noûs, 5: 513–519. (Scholar)
- –––, 1975, “Rigid Designation”, The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 363–369. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, “Plantinga and the Contingently Possible”, Analysis, 36: 106–109. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R. M., 1967, “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”, Noûs, 1: 1–8. (Scholar)
- –––, 1969, “The Loose and Popular and the Strict and Philosophical Senses of Identity”, in R. H. Grim and R. Care (eds), Perception and Personal Identity, Cleveland: Ohio University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, “Parts as Essential to their Wholes”, Review of Metaphysics, 26: 581–603. (Scholar)
- Church, A., 1954, “Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief”, Philosophical Studies, 5: 65–73; reprinted in Salmon and Soames, 1988. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, “Una observación respecto de la paradoja de Quine sobre la modalidad”, Análisis Filosófico, 2(1): 25–32. English version as “A Remark Concerning Quine’s Paradox About Modality” and reprinted in Salmon and Soames 1988. (Scholar)
- Crimmins, M., 1998, “Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and Reference”, Philosophical Review, 107: 1–48. (Scholar)
- Deutsch, H., 1997, “Identity and General Similarity”, Philosophical Perspectives, 12: 177–200. (Scholar)
- Dummett, M., 1991, “Does Quantification involve Identity?”, in H.G. Lewis (ed.), Peter Geach: Philosophical Encounters, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. (Scholar)
- Eglueta, R. and R. Jansana, 1999, “Definability of Leibniz
Equality”, Studia Logica, 63: 223–243. (Scholar)
- Enderton, H., 2000, A Mathematical Introduction to Logic, New York: Academic Press. (Scholar)
- Epstein, R., 2001, Predicate Logic, Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth. (Scholar)
- Evans, G., 1978, “Can There be Vague Objects?”, Analysis, 38: 308. (Scholar)
- Forbes, G., 1985, The Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “A New Riddle of Existence”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 415–430. (Scholar)
- Freund, M. A., 2019, The Logic of Sortals: A Conceptualist Approach, Cham: Springer. (Scholar)
- Gallois, A., 1986, “Rigid Designation and the Contingency of Identity”, Mind, 95: 57–76. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “Carter on Contingent Identity and Rigid Designation”, Mind, 97: 273–278. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “Occasional Identity”, Philosophical Studies, 58: 203–224. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change and Sameness, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Garbacz, P., 2002, “Logics of Relative Identity”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 43: 27–50. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Subsumption and Relative Identity”, Axiomathes, 14: 341–360. (Scholar)
- Geach, P.T., 1967 [1972], “Identity”, Review of
Metaphysics, 21(1): 3–12. Reprinted in Geach 1972, pp.
238–247. (Scholar)
- –––, 1972, Logic Matters, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, “Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity”, in M. Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology, New York: New York University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, Reference and Generality (third edition). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, A., 1975, “Contingent Identity”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 187–221. (Scholar)
- Goodman, N., 1968, Languages of Art, Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company. (Scholar)
- Griffin, N., 1977, Relative Identity, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Guillon, J.-B., 2021, “Coincidence as parthood”,
Synthese, 198: 4247–4276. (Scholar)
- Gupta, A., 1980, The Logic of Common Nouns, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- Heller, M., 1990, The Ontology of Physical Objects, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hinchliff, M., 1996, “The Puzzle of Change”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 119–133. (Scholar)
- Hodges, W., 1983, “Elementary Predicate Logic”, in D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, v.1, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
- Johnston, M., 1992, “Constitution is not Identity”, Mind, 101: 89–105. (Scholar)
- Koslicki, K., 2005, “Almost Indiscernible Objects and the Suspect Strategy”, The Journal of Philosophy, 102: 55–77. (Scholar)
- Kraut, R., 1980, “Indiscernibility and Ontology”, Synthese, 44: 113–135. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1971, “Identity and Necessity”, in M. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation, New York: New York University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds), Semantics of Natural Language, Boston: Reidel. Revised and reprinted as Kripke 1980. (Scholar)
- –––, 1979, “A Puzzle about Belief”, in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use, Dordrecht: Reidel. Reprinted in Salnon and Soames, 1988. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D. K., 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Many But Almost One”, in K. Campbell, J. Bacon, and L. Reinhardt (eds), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D.M. Armstrong, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Lewis, 1999. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley, 1987, The Hellenistic
Philosophers (Volume 1), Cambridge: Cambridge University
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- Lowe, E. J., 1982, “The Paradox of the 1,001 Cats”, Analysis, 42: 128–130. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, Kinds of Being, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Coinciding Objects: In Defence
of the ‘Standard Account”, Analysis, 55:
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- Mates, B., 1952, “Synonymity”, in L. Linsky (ed.), Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press. (Scholar)
- McGinn, C., 2000, Logical Properties, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Moltmann, F., 2013, “Tropes, Bare Demonstratives, and Apparent Statements of Identity”, Noûs, 47: 346–370. (Scholar)
- Molto, D., 2017, “The Logical Problem of the Trinity and the Strong Theory of Relative Identity”, Sophia, 56: 227–245. (Scholar)
- Myro, G., 1985, “Identity and Time”, in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, R. Grandy and R. Warner (eds). New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Noonan, H., 1980, Objects and Identity, The Hague: Springer Netherlands. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, “The Necessity of Origin”, Mind, 92: 1–20. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 183–193. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Constitution is Identity”, Mind, 102: 133–146. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Relative Identity”, in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Nozick. R., 1982, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- O’Connor, D.J., 1967, “Substance and Attribute”,
in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New
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- Oderberg, D., 1996, “Coincidence under a Sortal”, The Philosophical Review, 105: 145–171. (Scholar)
- Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Parsons, T., 2000, Indeterminate Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Perry, J., 1970, “The Same F”, The Philosophical Review, 79(2): 181–200. doi:10.2307/2183947 (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, “Relative Identity and Number”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 8: 1–15. (Scholar)
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- Quine, W. V. O., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1970, Philosophy of Logic, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
- Rea, M., 1995, “The Problem of Material Constitution”, The Philosophical Review, 104(4): 525–552. doi:10.2307/2185816 (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.), 1997, Material Constitution: A Reader, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Read, S., 1995, Thinking About Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Salmon, N., 1979, “How Not to Derive Essentialism
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- –––, 1986, “Reflexivity”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27: 401–429; reprinted in Salmon and Soames, 1988. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “The Logic of What Might Have Been”, Philosophical Review, 98: 3–34. (Scholar)
- Salmon, N. and S. Soames (eds), 1988, Propositions and Attitudes, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sedley, D., 1982, “The Stoic Criterion of Identity”, Phronesis, 27: 255–275. (Scholar)
- Silver, C., 1994, From Symbolic Logic…to Mathematical
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- Simons, P., 1987, Parts: A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Swindler, J. K., 1991, Weaving: An Analysis of the Constitution of Objects, Savage, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
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- Uzgalis, W., 1990, “Relative Identity and Locke’s
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- Van Inwagen, P., 1981, “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1994, “Not by Confusion of Substance, but by Unity of Person”, in Richard Swinburne & Alan G. Padgett (eds), Reason and the Christian Religion: Essays in Honour of Richard Swinburne, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 201–226. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Three persons in one being: on
attempts to show that the doctrine of the trinity is
self-contradictory”, in M.Y. Stewart (ed.), The Trinity:
East/West Dialogue, Boston: Kluwer, pp. 83–97. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, D., 1967, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1968, “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time”, Philosophical Review, 77: 90–95. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, Sameness and Substance, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Williams, C.J.F., 1990, What is Identity?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 1988, “First-order Logics for Comparative Similarity”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 29: 457–481. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, Identity and Discrimination, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 1987, “Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility”, Journal of Philosophy, 84: 293–314. (Scholar)
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- Zemach, E., 1974, “In Defence of Relative Identity”, Philosophical Studies, 26: 207–218. (Scholar)